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ABSTRACT: The establishment of a safe, secure and predictable environment combined with 
a capable legislation and operational key infrastructures is the only possible way for COIN 
forces to permanently isolate the insurgents from the populace and to gain their support. 
This can only be achieved through the combined and simultaneous utilization of skilled 
and proficient security forces and by administrative, economic, social development.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of written history there have been numerous conflicts and small wars 
that were not waged between two states, but between a state and a non-state actor . Since in 
many cases there were huge inequalities between the belligerents’ relative military and com-
bat power, the warring parties were forced to use significantly different tactics and strategies 
to defeat their opponents thus as an outcome these conflicts were asymmetric in nature. If we 
take a good look at the proportion of symmetric and asymmetric wars of all armed struggles 
in the second half of the 20th century and in the first seventeen years of the 21st century, we 
can clearly identify that most of the conflicts were asymmetric (Vietnam, Cuba, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Syria, Nigeria) .1 By analysing the asymmetric conflicts throughout the last 200 years, 
the following tendency can be seen . For the entire 200 years, it can be stated that 70 .8 per-
cent of the asymmetric conflicts were won by the stronger (the state) warring party. But by 
dividing the era into 50-year intervals the result is a lot more diversified. Between 1800 and 
1849 88 .2 percent, between 1850 and 1899 79 .5 percent during the 1900-1949 period 65 .1 
percent and between 1950 and 1998 only 45 percent of the asymmetric conflicts were won 
by the stronger party .2
Based on the above analysis it can be unambiguously stated that the closer we are to our 
present day, the less successful the stronger party has become in achieving its’ strategic goals 
and the more successful the weaker party has been in asymmetric conflicts. The decreasing 
1 Read, D. “Airpower in COIN: Can Airpower Make a Significant Contribution to Counter-Insurgency?”. Defence 
Studies 10/1-2 . 2010 . 126 . DOI: 10 .1080/14702430903392828, Accessed on 20 December 2010 .
2 Arreguín-Toft, I. “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict”. International Security 26/1 . 
2001 . 96-97 . https://web .stanford .edu/class/polisci211z/2 .2/Arreguin-Toft%20IS%202001 .pdf, Accessed on 04 
January 2018 .
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success of the nation states is what makes it extremely substantial to draw the attention of 
politicians, military leaders, and scholars to this type of armed struggles . Therefore, mili-
tary leaders and scholars must constantly analyse these asymmetric conflicts, to draw new 
conclusions, and to come up with new ideas and theories how regular armies combined with 
special operation forces and civilian advisors can efficiently combat this irregular enemy.
There are many theories, books and even military doctrines written about how our mil-
itary power should be used to defeat an enemy that uses insurgency, terrorism and guerrilla 
methods as their primary tactics . The leading doctrine for the US Military Forces on how to 
operate against an insurgent force – the 2007 United States Army and Marine Corps Field 
Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency – whose making was coordinated and overlooked by 
General David Petraeus and David Kilcullen mentions two different types of approach to 
defeating insurgencies . With the enemy-focused approach, which mainly concentrates on 
hunting down the insurgents, COIN3 forces are not able to accomplish their assigned tasks 
most of the time . Instead of killing the enemy the focus should rather be on isolating the 
insurgents from the population and on improving their living standards . In opposition to 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs – which states that the most important necessities for mankind 
are the physiological needs – in COIN operations the emphasis should rather be focused 
primarily on the security of society .
Figure 1: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs4 
Foremost the security of the populace must be guaranteed and only after that – or par-
allel with it – can the emphasis be put on the development of critical infrastructures such as 
healthcare, road-system, public utility, communication systems and good governance which 
is free from corruption .
3 Counter Insurgency
4 “Needs for Lifestages” . http://needsforlifestagessmhs .weebly .com/maslows-pyramid4 .html, Accessed on 24 
January 2018 .
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SOME VERY SHORT CASE-STUDIES
On September 10, 2009, a patrol was sent out from the American-led Jalalabad5 PRT6 in 
Dara-i-Nur District, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan to handover a hydro plant to the locals 
in a remote area of the district . On the way, back from the ceremony the US convoy was 
ambushed by RPGs7 and small arms fire. It did not require a great effort from the attackers to 
choose the location of the ambush since the Afghan hills and the sparse road network made 
the movements of the Americans predictable and forced them to use the exact same road 
whenever they wanted to get to and from their base to this part of the district . Still, the site 
of the attack did not help the accomplishment of a successful ambush, because it was too 
far from the road for the RPGs and for the machine guns to lay down an effective fire on the 
MRAPs8 or on the dismounting soldiers . The execution of the attack was also half-hearted 
and lacked professionalism because the attackers did not make serious effort to block the 
road or to blow up the bridge to halt the American convoy. They chose firing positions on 
the forward slope of the mountain making their own withdrawal nearly impossible and giv-
ing away their own positions by the dirt that the RPGs kicked off by firing them. Most of 
the soldiers travelling in the convoy and their military leaders believed that the Taliban was 
responsible for conducting the attack, but deeper analysis revealed that this was not the case .
Dara-i-Nur district, where the ambush took place has never been supportive towards the 
Taliban not even during the era when they were in power throughout the country . Further-
more, no Taliban activity had ever been reported or observed by any coalition, allied or local 
forces and indigenous inhabitants in the region before this attack happened . This district is 
inhabited mainly by Pashai people who are not supporters of the central government9 but 
they do not provide support for the Taliban either, which is mainly Pashtun . Locals did not 
tolerate outsiders in their area and it was almost impossible to for the Taliban to operate in 
this region without the knowledge of the locals . It would have not made any sense either for 
the Taliban to insert some forces to the region since there were only a couple of weeks left 
until winter season arrived which would have locked them in this zone isolated from their 
base areas or safe havens in Pakistan . In conclusion, all the evidence collected and analysed 
by the investigators suggested that the ambush was not conducted by the Taliban so they 
turned their attention towards the mission that the PRT personnel were conducting that day .
The main objective of the mission was to hold a handover ceremony where the engi-
neers and US military personnel from the Jalalabad PRT would officially put in operation 
a hydro plant which could provide electricity for half of the village . The intent of this con-
struction was not only to improve the living standard of the locals but also to give them work 
opportunity on the construction site with which the goal was to provide alternative revenue 
streams to farmers other than growing and selling poppy . Next to the hydro plant another 
5 Capital of Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan
6 Provincial Reconstruction Team – the first PRT emerged in an ad hoc way but a couple years later PRTs were 
common throughout Afghanistan and they were all part of a multinational reconstruction effort. PRTs included 
civilian and military specialists responsible for providing guidance for the provincial leaders in order to facilitate 
nation building and economic growth and good governance .
7 Rocket Propelled Grenade
8 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles
9 Almost no tribes or inhabitants of any districts were supportive to the central government this deep in the coun-
try . Most of the time these tribes lived separated from all other tribes and they only wanted and still just want to 
be left alone .
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project – the building of a slaughterhouse – was also ongoing further increasing the living 
standard and job opportunities of the local inhabitants . Neither of these projects were done 
in the central area of the province but in a peripheral zone and the attack did not happen near 
the construction sites . Since the ambush site was close to the district centre and tactically it 
was not performed in a professional manner made the analysts think that the attack was not 
conducted by a well-organized insurgent force like the Taliban but rather by local inhabitants 
unsatisfied with the fact that a certain part of their province gets infrastructures that improve 
the living standards of the nearby populace while leaving the central area of the province 
completely out of the development process .10
A similar incident happened in Helmand province where the security guards of a road 
construction were attacked and killed by locals just because the constructors did not con-
sult them whether they needed the road or not and because they did not hire local workers 
and security personnel from the surrounding villages but they got the job done by foreign 
workers . Besides there was a Taliban opposition to the construction of the road too since de-
veloped road systems and well-maintained high-speed avenues of approaches make it easier 
for bigger armies to manoeuvre and by this, roads make defeating insurgency and governing 
a lot easier . So, insurgents and locals had a common interest in this case which made them 
cooperate to stop the construction .11
A third incident to underline my point happened in Wanat where a US PRT intended to 
build a road into a valley. This valley was a traditional buffer zone between two hostile pop-
ulation groups the Nuristanis and Safi Pashtuns. In this case the locals and the Taliban also 
had a shared interest since the locals did not want the road to be built because it kept them 
isolated from their historical enemies and helped them keep their autonomy from the central 
government while the Taliban opposed this avenue because it would have brought ANA12 
and US troops in striking distance to their major infiltration routes to and from their bases.13
From the above-mentioned examples, it can be stated that critical infrastructures or the 
lack of critical infrastructures may have a significant role in COIN operations. On the one 
hand, for a weakened or not yet properly operating central government – with the primary 
mission of nation building – or for an occupying force the creation and maintenance of systems 
like a well-maintained road network, healthcare, public utility, communication systems and 
corruption free governance are vital to win the support of the population . On the other hand, 
for an insurgent group opposing the power of the central government the destruction or the pre-
vention of improving these systems may go hand in hand with success . As in Helmand prov-
ince and in the city of Wanat the Taliban did not want the roads to be built because they would 
have made high speed avenues of approaches for highly mobile mechanized government units 
with enormous firepower which would or could have resulted in catastrophic consequences for 
the insurgents . By the government being able to send and successfully use extremely mobile 
forces in great number, the freedom of movement and the capability to execute attacks would 
have been seriously limited for the insurgents . It is also not favourable for rebellious forces to 
let COIN forces build any other kind of infrastructures – such as hydro plants – because as the 
government improves the living standard of the population the inhabitants would slowly but 
10 Kilcullen, D . Out of the Mountains, The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2015 . 3-10 .
11 Kilcullen . Out of the Mountains. 10-11 .
12 Afghan National Army
13 Kilcullen . Out of the Mountains. 11-12 .
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surely turn away from the guerrilla forces . The long-term objective for the government or the 
COIN forces is to assume full responsibility and accountability for the vital services .
From the inductions derived from the Jalalabad, Helmand and Wanat examples it can 
be stated that the defeat of an insurgency does not always primarily depend on the number 
of insurgents killed in kinetic direct actions but also on how the government or COIN forces 
can improve the living conditions of the population .
“A REVOLUTIONARY WAR IS 20 PERCENT MILITARY ACTION  
AND 80 PERCENT POLITICAL!”14
There are two main kinds of approaches to counterinsurgency operations . One – which by 
most of the field manuals, essays, and books is referred to as the enemy-centric counterinsur-
gency approach – puts the focus on the elimination or killing of hostile guerrilla forces . The 
other – and in most of the cases the more effective way of fighting insurgency – is a more 
indirect method which is usually referred to as the population-centric approach .
The primary goal of every COIN force is to make an area – which may be part of a coun-
try, or even an entire county – free of insurgents. If a COIN force has a sufficient number 
of troops, then it is a relatively easy task to drive away, kill or capture the key leaders, the 
hardliners, and the fighting elements or cells of an insurgent movement. The challenge has 
always been in keeping the cleared area free of insurgents and in preventing the guerrillas 
from re-infiltrating, so that COIN forces may move to other areas – or in case of a third party 
to withdraw to their own countries – and to hand over security tasks to local police forces .
With the enemy-centric approach where COIN forces focus almost exclusively on kill-
ing guerrillas, the goal of keeping an area free of insurgents permanently is almost unachiev-
able .15 It is not feasible because while it is relatively easy to disperse and to expel insurgent 
forces from a certain zone, it is almost impossible to destroy their political organizations and 
their ideology and to rally the bulk of the population by purely military actions .16 Political 
organizations may be temporarily destroyed by intensive police actions, but it is still impos-
sible to prevent the return of the guerrillas and to prevent them from re-establishing their 
political parties unless the population cooperates with and provides support to the COIN 
forces . If most of the population sponsors and assists the insurgents it is preposterous for 
COIN forces to believe in success . Therefore, guerrilla forces focus on obtaining and keep-
ing the support of the populace by either coercive or non-coercive means . As Mao Zedong 
said guerrillas cannot operate without the help of the population:
It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish 
out of its native element cannot live .17 
Therefore, the focus should be on draining the sea,18 which means that the main ob-
jective for COIN forces – just as well as for insurgents – should be the population . This 
15 Resperger, I ., Kiss, Á . and Somkuti, B . Aszimmetrikus hadviselés a modern korban. Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 
2013 . 225-226 .
16 Galula . Counterinsurgency Warfare. 52
17 Zedong, M . “The Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare” . In Zedong, M .: On guerrilla warfare. Maoist Doc-
umentation Project, Mao Tse-tung Reference Archive, 2000 . https://www .marxists .org/reference/archive/mao/
works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ch06 .htm, Accessed on 23 March 2018 .
18 Zagorski, P . W . and Harmon, S . A . “The War on Terror: Separating the (Star) Fish from the Sea” . Freedom From 
Fear Magazine, issue 5. http://f3magazine.unicri.it/?p=419, Accessed on 22 March 2018.
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objective can only be accomplished through the population-centric counterinsurgency app-
roach which puts the emphasis mainly on the protection of the population and on the fulfil-
ment of their necessities . The easiest way to describe the basic needs of the commonwealth 
is through critical infrastructures – the existence of an operable healthcare, road-network, 
public utility, and communication system and a corruption free governance is vital to win 
the support of the populace . But even if the most advanced infrastructure system is run in 
a certain area, even if the inhabitants live in an outstandingly developed milieu, the most 
important aspect of meeting the needs of the population is a safe, secure and predictable 
environment . Progress in building support for the host nation government requires protect-
ing the populace. Thus, an effective political and economic action on the population must 
be preceded by military, secret service and police operations against the guerrilla units . If 
the population is not convinced that COIN forces have the will and the capabilities to defeat 
the insurgency, counterinsurgent forces will not be able to win the support of the populace . 
People who do not believe that they are secure from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and 
reprisals will not risk overtly supporting COIN efforts.19 A permanent victory can only be 
achieved through the physical (military, police actions) and the psychological (counter prop-
aganda, development of key infrastructures) isolation of the insurgents from the population 
and by addressing and eliminating the root causes of the insurgency . Military and police 
forces can compel obedience and secure areas, however, they cannot by themselves achieve 
the political settlement needed to resolve the situation . Thus, COIN operations should com-
bine offensive, defensive and stability operations to achieve a stable and secure environment 
needed for essential governance, essential services, and economic development .20
Figure 2: Essential services and their objectives21 
19 “Counterinsurgency” . Headquarters Department of the Army . December 2006 . 5-20 . http://usacac .army .mil/
cac2/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24 .pdf, Accessed on 16 December 2017 .
20 “Counterinsurgency” . 5-2 .
21 “Counterinsurgency” . 5-15 .
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“POLITICAL POWER GROWS OUT OF THE BARREL  
OF A GUN”22 … BUT! 
Most of the time there are several groups who contest for the control of a community . Even 
when we talk about the different parties in democratic states trying to win the elections, or 
about warlords, guerrillas or insurgents fighting against each other or against the central 
government, there is always one thing that is common . It is almost never just one party, one 
group, band, gang or any kind of none state actor struggling to gain the upper hand over a 
certain part of the population, but several or at least two . That armed actor that the populace 
sees as the most competent to establish a resilient normative system23 by which this actor 
can provide security, project full-spectrum control over violence, control, conduct or even 
improve economic activities is most likely to prevail in gaining control .24 In other words, this 
means that whoever sets up rules that is correlated with a set of consequences with which the 
group can maintain a resilient system of control that gives people the sense of security, and a 
predictable and safe environment, is going to gain the support of the population . The empha-
sis here is on the “resilient, full-spectrum control”.25 Though for the groups fighting to gain 
the control over a certain populace being armed is critical, indispensable, and a priority it is 
not a sufficient characteristic. A very good example of it is Iraq in 2006-2007. Al Qa’eda in 
Iraq could enforce their will on a large number of inhabitants only by coercive means, but it 
did not prove to be long-standing . As soon as the Coalition Forces increased their presence 
in the insurgent-ruled area and the inhabitants realized that the foreign forces could protect 
them from the atrocities committed by the insurgents, moreover, they even provided social 
justice, work opportunities, a running healthcare, school and a workable public utility sys-
tem they turned their back on Al Qa’eda in Iraq and started supporting the Coalition Forces . 
During this period the number of Al Qa’eda fighters and followers dropped significantly 
and the organization almost ceased to exist . This was the case up until the President of the 
United States publicly announced that he was going to withdraw forces from Iraq . From 
that point on the locals knew, that the most competent group that would stay permanently 
in their region is Al Qa’eda in Iraq, which resulted in the loss of support for the Coalition 
Forces and slowly but surely helped the evolution of the Islamic State . In conclusion, it can 
be stated that every time when different groups struggle for the control over the population 
the actor that creates a better normative system of competitive control is likely to dominate 
the target audience .26
CONCLUSION
Military doctrines, books and articles written about counterinsurgency mention two differ-
ent types of method to fight against insurgents. The one which puts the emphasis primarily 
on killing the enemy and does not deal with the securement and the improvement of living 
standards of the population is usually not as effective as the population-centric counterinsur-
gency approach . The later tactic stresses the importance of meeting the basic and essential 
23 Alchourron, C . and Bulygin, E . Normative Systems. New York: Springer Verlag, 1971 . 53-59 .
24 Kilcullen, D . Counterinsurgency. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010 . 152-154 .
25 Kilcullen . Counterinsurgency. 152 .
26 Kilcullen . Out of the Mountains. 133 .
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necessities that individuals and communities need and which has long been identified in 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs .
The establishment of a safe, secure, and predictable environment combined with a ca-
pable legislation and operational key infrastructures is the only possible way to permanently 
isolate the insurgents from the populace and to gain their support . This can only be achieved 
through the combined and simultaneous utilization of skilled and proficient security forces 
and by administrative, economic, social development .
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